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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICH'ARDS !and 
LYNNE P. RICHARDS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHN VATSIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDEN'T'S BR'IEF 
Case No. 
10049 
STATE'MENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE 
'I'he action in the lower court was brought by 
a seller of real estate for damages arising from the 
buyer's breach of the earnest money agreement. 
DTSPOSITION IN LOWER COUR1T 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honor-
able Aldon J. Anderson presiding, gave judgment 
against the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON ~PPEAL 
The Appellant-defendant seeks complete rever-
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sal of the judgment against h'im or a modification 
of the damages a warded to Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FkCTS 
Respondents offer :additional facts that were 
omitted from Appellant's Statement of Facts because 
there were two earnest money agreements between 
the Respondents and the Appellant in this case, and 
it is ne~cessary to set forth the circum'Stances sur-
rounding both agreements, even ·tjhough the action 
was brought only under the second iagreement. 
On August 7, 1962, the Appellant, John Vatsis, 
entered into an earnest money agreement with Re-
spondents whereby Appellant pa:id $100.00 to the 
real es'tate agent a'S earnest money on the sale of 
Respondents' home which was priced iat $31,000.00 
(EXhibits R-144). As a part of this agreement Ap-
pellant traded his equity in his home to the Respon-
dents (Exhibits R-144). Appellant represented to 
and contracted with Respondents that there was no 
lien on the home he was trading to them (R-141). 
However, Appellant breached his :agreement with 
Respondents as there w.as a prior $4,000.00 judg-
ment aga:inst Appellant constituting a lien against 
the trade-in house of Appellant. Appellant had not 
disclosed to Respondents the existence of the lien 
(R-141). Respondents asked Appellant to remove 
the lien to conforn1 to the agreement. AppeHant did 
not remove the lien and, therefore, the Respondents, 
several times prior to October 9, 1962, asked Appel-
lant to n1ove from the Respondents' home (R-141). 
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Because of the judgment lien, both Appellant and 
Respondents considered the first earnest money 
agreement terminated. (Vatsis Deposition pp. 35, 
38. R-t38-139). Other than the $100.00 earnest 
money 1and $120.00 rent from a third party which 
Respondents received from the trade-in house, no 
money was paid by Appellant to Respondents under 
this agreement of August 7, 1962 (R-139, 142), 
although by its terms larger payments were requir-
ed. (Exhibits R-144). 
After Respondents had several times requested 
Appellant to move because Appellant had breached 
the first earnest money agreement, the Appellant 
and the real estate agent made a new earnest money 
agreement (Exhibits R-144) which was to be pre-
sented for Respondents' approval to enable Appel-
lant to s'tay in the Responden·ts' house (R-105, Vat-
sis DepositJion p. 35). This second earnest money 
agreement was dated October 9, 196'2, and contained 
a recital that $350.00 was paid as earnest money. 
The agreement does not indicate how the earnest 
money was to be paid or how it had 'been paid (Ex-
hibits R-144). The Appellant made out a check 'to 
Respondents for $250.00 and the real estate agent 
apparently agreed to credit Appellant with $100.00 
because Appellant had previously paid $100.00 under 
the first agreement. Respondents never a nthorized 
such an arrangement and the earnest money agree-
ment does not show it (R-67, Exhibits R-144). This 
second earnest money agreement set the price of 
Respondents' house . at $27,750.00 which was 
$1,250.00 less than the original agreement. 
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Appellant stopped payment on the $250.00 
check (R-98), and moved out of Respondents' home 
on November 2nd or 3rd, 19S:2, without making any 
other payment to Respondents under the second 
agreement. (Appellant was unaware that !his wife 
had moved out of the home until some time later 
as he was out of town (R~104-105) ). Mter Appel-
lant moved from the house, Respondents made ex-
tensive efforts to sell the home (R-64, 65, 86), and 
finally sold 'i't to a third party for $'27,000.00 (Ex-
hibits, R-144), which was $~2,7'50.00 less than the 
price set in the second earnest money agreement. 
Respondents brought an action agiainst Appel-
lant for breach of contract and the lower court 
a warded damages to Respondents, finding ~ba:t the 
$1100.00 was paid under the first agreement iand 
belonged wholly to the Respondents inasmuch as 
there was a clear breach of the first agreement ( R-
4 7) . As a result of the stop payment order of the 
$250.00 check, no earnest money was paid under 
the second agreement and consequently, the Respon-
dents could not be put to an election of remedies 
and could not be required to tender back earnest 
monies they had not received. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT HAVE E'LECTED 
TO KEEP ANY EARNEST MONEY PAin UNDER THE 
AGREEMENT SUED UPON BECAUSE RESPONDENTS 
RCgiVED NOTHING FROM APPElJLAN'T. 
Appellant relies on the rule of Andreason v. 
·1 
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Hansen, 8 Utah 2d. 370, 335, P.2d. 404 ( 1959) and 
followed in subsequent cases, that a seller of real 
estate who does ndt tender return of or return earn-
est money pa:id has elected to keep such payments as 
liquidated damages and is barred from suing for 
damages under the agreement. It is submitted that 
the present situation is :£actually different from the 
Andreason case because the Respondents did not 
receive any earnest money or consideration from 
Appellants under the earnest money agreement sued 
upon. The earnest money agreement of October 9, 
19'62 sued upon (Exhibits, R-144) states in line 
3 that tlle sum of $'350.00 was deposited as earnest 
money, whereas in fact, the Appellant deposited only 
a check in the amount of $'250.00 (R-84-85) and 
payment on the said check was stopped. ('R-98). 
In Andreason v. Hansen, supra, Seller was de-
fin'itely paid the earnest money recited in the agree-
m·ent. In the instant action, no earnest money what-
soever was paid under· the earnest money agree-
ment sued upon. Thus, a ruling by the court as 
urged by the Appellant that the instant case is gov-
erned by Andreason v. Hansen would be in effect 
a ruling that a recitation in an earnest money ~agree­
ment is binding upon the seller despite tlle fact 
that no consideration whatsoever was paid. There 
is no indication of such a rule in Andreason v Han-
sen or in McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 U.2d 142, 349 
P.2d 720, or in Close v. Blumenthal, 11 U.2d 51, 354 
P.2d 856. Indeed, such a rule as urged by Appellant 
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would be contrary to the rule heretofore laid down by 
this court in Afton Livestock Company v. Peterson, 
62 Utah 437, 220 Pac. 710 (19'32), wherein the 
court indicated that showing the true amount of 
consideration paid is permissible. See a~so Paloni v. 
Beebe, 100 Utah 115, 110 P.12d ;563 (1940) !and 
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 4 75, 
2'5 'P .'2d 952 ( 1'933). 
The language of the earnes~t money agreement 
sued upon (Line 34) explicitly states that the 
amounts paid may "at the option of the seller be 
retained as liquidated and agreed damage's." By 
stopping payment on the $250.00 check given as 
earnest money, the Appellant has not lived up to 
the agreement and has removed the option right to 
any election of remedies that was available to Re-
spondents. As ·stated in McKown v. Driver, 54 Wash. 
2d. 46, 337 P.'2d 1068, 1073 (195'9), '~One is bound 
by an election of remedies when all of three essentiial 
conditions are present: ( 1) the existence of two 
or more remedies a:t the time of tlle election ; ( 2) 
inconsistency between such remedies; and ( 3) a 
choice of one of them." 
By stopping payment on the $2:50.00 check 
given pursuant to 'the earnest money agreement, the 
Appellant eliminated any election of remedies that 
was available to Respondents and rendered it im-
possible for Respondents to comply With the rule 
laid down by this court in Andreason v. Hansen and 
cases thereunder because there was nothing to re-
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turn. Appellant, however, seeks to bring the instant 
action back within the rule of Andreason v. Hansen 
by asserting th!at because Appellant and Respon-
dents entered into a completely separate and prior 
earnest money agreement whereby Appe'llant pa'id 
to Respondents the sum of $100.00, the Respondents 
were obligated to return the said $100.00 prior to 
filing suit on the earnest money agreement actually 
sued upon. Broause of this contention by Appellant, 
the trial court was forced to consider the ownership 
of the subject $100.00 and of the agreement upon 
whiCh it wa;s predicated. (R-H7). The trial court 
concluded that the $100.00 was Respondents' money 
under a separate and pri'or agreement and the credit-
ing of this amount to Appellant by the real estate 
agent involved operated only to reduce 'the earnest 
money under the agreement sued upon from $3150.00 
to $250.00 (R-48-49). There is ample evidence in 
the record to support 'tHis finding of the court. In 
reviewing the evidence relied upon by the tri'al court, 
it is noted that this court has eonsisten tly held that 
on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs, the 
evidence will be construed in a light most favor-
able to the plaintiffs. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western 
Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 Pac. 9'7. 
The record discloses that Appellant obviously 
understood that he had violate dthe earnest money 
agreement of August 7, 1962, under which the 
$100.00 was paid and that he had been requested 
to move from Respondents' home. (R-141). Appel-
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lant further radmitted that he understood the first 
earnest money agreement to have been terminated 
as a result of his breach of this agreement ( V atsis 
Deposition, pp. 35, 38). It is further noted that the 
Appe'llant offered no evidence whatsoever that tlle 
$100.00 belonged to him whereas the Respondents 
rat all times claimed ownership of the $'100.00 (R-
69, t3'8-l39). The trial court thus correctly held 
that the $100.00 paid under ·the August 7, 1962 
earnest money agreement was the property of Re-
spondents and, therefore, the only effect of the real 
estate agent crediting this amount to Appellant was 
to reduce the amount of the earnest money deposit 
required under the ~arnest money agreement that 
was sued upon. 
POINT 11 
'THE TRIAL COURT ·CORRECTLY ASSESSED 
DAMAGE'S AGAINST A!PPELLANT INAS1MU:CH AS 
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT 1HA VE 'MADE AN E1LEC-
TION .A!N'D CONSEQUENTLY THE DAMAGES WOULD 
THEN BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OF-
FER AND THE ACTUAL MARKET VAUUE OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
Because no earnest money was paid under the 
e·arnest money agreement sued upon, Respondents 
are not bound 'by any liquidated damage clause in 
that !agreement and therefore the measure of dam-
ages 1is as stated in Cole v. Parker, 5 Uuah 2d 263, 
300 P.2d 6'23: 
"Thus, in the absence of fraud, the seller is 
entitled to be credited, in the computation of 
damage sustained because of the breach of 
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the contract, the difference between the con-
tract price and the price for which he dan 
sell the forfeited property . . ." 
Andreason v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 
(19'59) states that the measure of damages is the 
difference between the purchaser's offer and the ac-
tual market v:alue of the property. In Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 Utah 46'8, 243 P.2d 446, the court 
again stated that the measure of damages is the 
advantageous bargain lost by the ptaintiff, together 
with damages for the fair rental value of the prop-
erty during the period of occupancy. 
It is without contradiction that Respondents 
had to sell the property for $2,750.00 less than the 
Appellant had agreed to pay (Exhibits R-144); 
that Respondents incurred substan'tial expenses be-
cause of Appellant's breach (R-6'6, 74-7'5); that the 
subsequent buyers were bona fide purchasers of 
the home (R-87); and that Respondents were dili-
gen't in their efforts to sell the property ( R-'86) . 
Thus, the measure of dam:ages assessed by the 
trial court was proper and consistent with the rul'.; 
for ascertaining damages set forth by this court in 
the Cole, Andreason and Perkins decisions cite\_~ 
above. 
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CONCLUSION 
'The findings of the triJal court that Respondents 
never received any earnest money under the agree-
ment sued upon are correct, and the measure of 
damages assessed against Appellant are proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKINS & WILKINS 
W AL'TER P. FABER, JR. 
3'36 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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